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Article 3

SECURITY LAW, FORMALISM AND ARTICLE 9

SECURITY LAW, FORMALISM AND ARTICLE 9
Grant Gilmore*
The history of personal property security law in this country
has been not unlike the history of a protracted guerrilla war. Rightthinking people seem always to have felt that there was something
vaguely dishonorable, if not outright dishonest, about transactions in
which a loan is secured by a debtor's personal property-particularly about transactions in which the debtor is allowed to remain
in possession of the property and to enjoy its full use during the
loan period. Exactly what it is that is dishonorable or dishonest
about such transactions has never been made clear. Right-thinking
people have usually found "fraud" the most helpful debating termthe transaction in question is constructively, even if it is not actually, fraudulent. And of course once you have characterized anything as "constructive fraud," the possibility of further rational
argument is at an end.
For over a hundred and fifty years-which is as far back in
time as our subject takes us-the forces of the Establishment, led
by the judiciary, black robes flying and pens at the ready, have
campaigned against the guerrilla bands of the personal property
security people. The judicial literature is a long paean of denunciation in which the constructive fraud inherent in superficially innocent transactions is astutely detected and relentlessly laid bare. But
the guerrillas, worsted at each encounter, always fled to fight
another day. And from time to time the guerrillas managed to
establish a beachhead, to occupy an enclave, to settle down on some
bit of unwanted territory-either because the Establishment was
momentarily distracted by affairs of greater moment or because the
guerrillas had cleverly disguised themselves in the armor of the
righteous, or because, in the long run, even the most gallant defender
of the faith will have his moments of weakness.
We are all familiar with the principal engagements of our
Hundred Years War. There were the battles of the after-acquired
property clause and of its disreputable twin, the future advance
clause. There were the campaigns of the stock-in-trade mortgage
and other types of inventory financing. There was the short,
* Harry E. Bigelow Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School The following paper also appears in The Proceedings of the
1967 Mississippi Law Institute at page 241, published by the BobbsMerrill Co., and is here reprinted by arrangement with the publisher
of the Proceedings. It was delivered as a lecture at the University of
Nebraska College of Law on November 8, 1967.
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savage infighting over accounts receivable financing. And so on.'
Eventually, of course, the personal property people had their
way-but the point of enduring consequence is that they had their
way in a complicated, devious, even underground fashion. In time
it became possible, throughout the country, to finance on the security
of inventory and receivable, to cover after-acquired property and to
provide for future advances. What did not become possible-we are
still talking of the pre-Code law-was to do any of these things
simply.
Each new extension of the area of personal property security
was achieved after a prolonged resistance had been overcome and
was regarded with a general suspicion and distrust. We have come
to speak of the several new types of security arrangements which
appeared during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the
early part of this century as "devices." The trust receipt was a
"device." The factor's lien was a "device." The field-warehousing
arrangement was a "device." The common usage of the word "device" in this context is not without interest. "Device" connotes
ingenuity, cleverness, trickery; a legal device is a gimmick for getting around some prohibition imposed by the substantive law. As
indeed all our new-fangled security devices were. Their proponents
sought to validate previously invalid transactions by the simple
expedient of calling the prohibited transactions by new names.
Frequently their attempts were frustrated by the courts; occasionally-most dramatically in the case of the trust receipt-they were
successful.
The uncomfortable aura of deception, which has from the
beginning emanated from the various personal property security
devices, explains the quite extraordinary degree of complexity
which came to be the leading characteristic of security law in its
intermediate, or pre-Code, phase. A new device had, let us assume,
won some degree of judicial recognition. The recognition was, however, a grudging one. The one thing that everyone agreed on was
that, even assuming that there was such as thing as a "trust receipt,"
its use must be kept within the narrowest possible limits. Its
boundaries must be precisely mapped and the slightest overstepping
of the bounds must lead to disaster-disaster, that is, for the unwary
secured lender, whose misfortune would be, of course, the occasion
for jubilation among the debtor's other creditors. Each new device
I I have dealt at length with many of the matters which are referred to
in the following discussion in my book, G. GiLmoRE, SECuRITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (2 vols. 1965). I shall not attempt in the paper

to document all the statements that are made. The curious reader can
find documentation in the relevant chapters of the book.
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promptly developed its own ritual, its own elaborate system of
necessary formalities.
Personal property security law thus became, in this century,
one of the most highly formalized bodies of law of which we have
record. In Anglo-America law its formalism can be matched, or
perhaps surpassed, only in the law of negotiable instruments where,
as we have often been told, form quite triumphed over substance.
Form, of course, never triumphs over substance; substance occasionally finds an appropriate expression for a time in a highly formal
dress. Negotiable instruments formalism established itself the better
part of a century before security formalism. It is a plausible
hypothesis that, in the two cases, like causes led to like results.
If the formalism, in both areas of law, is currently in process of
breakdown-which seems to be the case-it should also be possible
to assign like causes, or identical causes, for the breakdown.2
Formalities with respect to the execution of documents had been
with us, in security law, since the earliest chattel mortgage acts.
Requirements that all signatures be acknowledged or verified may
have been merely reflections of the stately ceremonial which had
become traditional in real estate transactions. But it should not be
forgotten that the chattel mortgage, which later achieved a sort of
respectability, was, in the early days, thought to be just this side of
fraudulent conveyance. Thus, the chattel mortgagee was typically
required to swear, in all solemnity, to his own good faith and lack
,of fraudulent intent-an early version, we might say, of current
loyalty oaths and, no doubt, equally effective.
The formalities or rituals which were developed in connection
with the later devices went well beyond the documents.
The essential article of faith in the theology of the common
law trust receipt had to do with the passage of title to the goods
whose sale was being financed. Title had to pass from A (an exporter, manufacturer or other seller) to B (a bank or other financing
agency) to D (the ultimate buyer) without ever having been, even
for an instant of time, in C (the security "trustee," a dealer, broker or other purchaser for resale). Title in C at any point meant
that the "trust receipt" was void as a disguised (and in any case
unrecorded) chattel mortgage. Under this formulation the trust
receipt became a useful device-principally in a few seaboard states
2

I shall not further pursue in this paper the problem of the growth and
current breakdown of formalism in negotiable instruments law. The
parallel developments in that field are discussed, from a somewhat
different point of view, in Gilmore, On Statutori Obsolescence, 39 U.
COLO. L. REv. 461 (1967).
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-for the short-term financing of imports into the United States.
When, during the 1920's, the trust receipt was sought to be put to
use in wholesale automobile distribution in this country, the experiment ran into trouble almost everywhere, principally for the reason
that it proved impossible to keep title out of C (the automobile
dealer). The sales finance companies, which\had been almost forced
into the financing of automobile distribution, undertook the desperate gamble of a codifying statute-a gamble which eventually
paid off in the widespread enactment of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act. 3 The Trust Receipts Act deleted from the formal requisites of
trust receipt financing the common law requirement of "no title in C"
and stated its own formal requisites in a section captioned "What
Constitutes Trust Receipt Transaction and Trust Receipt" (UTRA
§2). You may have escaped the necessity of studying the provisions
of UTRA §2. If so, I congratulate you-that way madness lies. The
statutory formulation of trust receipt theology had effortlessly
achieved the apparent impossibility of being even more impenetrably obscure than the common law formulation. There is, however, a further point to which we shall return in due course: in the
fields they were designed to serve, both formulations-common
law and statutory-worked extremely well.
Field-warehousing, which developed almost simultaneously
with the trust receipt as an alternative method of inventory financing, never claimed to be a new "device," just invented and hot off
the griddle. On the contrary, field-warehousing presented itself as
just another old-fashioned common law pledge, exactly like any
other old-fashioned common-law pledge. Sceptical observers were
not overwhelmed by the presentation and, as the price of survival,
the field-warehousemen were driven to invent some novel trappings
for their "device." Trust receipt formalism had emphasized dogmatic theology-title-passing and all that. Field-warehousing formalism, which developed under somewhat different circumstances,
emphasized liturgy more than dogma-the ritual performance of
magic acts.
The stage was set for the field-warehousing breakthrough by
two decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In 1905 the
Court held that a trustee in bankruptcy could not set aside the
security interest of a bank which held in pledge field warehouse
3 The Trust Receipts Act was promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933. By 1940 it had been enacted
in ten states, including California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New
York. Ultimately, before being replaced by Article 9 of the Code, it
was enacted in thirty-eight states.
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receipts issued by the Security Warehousing Company.4 In 1907, on
apparently indistinguishable facts and with respect to receipts
issued by the same company, the Court held the receipts void and
the attempted pledge of inventory a fraudulent conveyance. 5 Since
the second case did not purport to overrule the first case, the upshot
seemed to be that there were "good" field-warehouses and "bad"
field-warehouses, although neither Justice Holmes' opinion in the
first case nor Justice Peckham's opinion in the second case even
hinted at what the distinguishing difference could be.
Out of this apparently unpromising situation, the field-warehousemen promptly created a large flourishing industry. It seems
to have been assumed that the distinction between a Holmesian or
good warehouse and a Peckhanaite or bad warehouse lay in the
ritual. At all events the ritual was laid on with a trowel-leases,
signs, chicken-wire, "independent custodians" and all the other
conventional signs by which a properly run-field-warehouse is distinguished from a fraudulent conveyance. The lower courts, in the
absence of further oracles from the Supreme Court, went along
with the assumption that the ritual was all-important. And it is
to be noted that the field-warehousing formalities, like the somewhat different trust receipt formalities, worked. If you were to read
through the dreary catalogue of field-warehousing litigation between 1910 and 1950, you would discover that, by the 1940's, the
improperly run field-warehouse had all but disappeared. The
Lawrence Warehouse Company and its competitors had become past
masters at performing the tricky ritual which they had, after all,
invented. Of course, to say that a field-warehouse is properly run
is not quite the same thing as to say that the goods will be in the
warehouse when they are needed-as lenders on the security of
soy-bean oil and other interesting commodities have not infrequently
learned.
The field-warehousing experience was duplicated, a generation
later, in the area of non-notification accounts receivable financing.
This time only one Supreme Court decision was needed and the
receivables financiers learned their lesson much more quickly than
the field-warehousemen had. Thus, it may be, we learn from
experience.
In Benedict v. Ratner6, the Supreme Court dealt with a financing
arrangement under which the assignor went on making collections
from the account debtors (who were not notified of the assignment)
4 Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U.S. 530 (1905).
5 Security Warehouseing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907).
6 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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and used the proceeds of the collections in the ordinary course of his
business without accounting for them to the assignee. The Court
held, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, that the arrangement was
void against the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy as a fraudulent
conveyance under New York law. Justice Brandeis may or may not
have read his New York law correctly but, at all events, the rule in
Benedict soon acquired a sort of federal aura. There were suggestions in Massachusetts and Michigan that the rule was not, as a
matter of state law, in force in those states but everywhere else the
courts, both state and federal, found or assumed that the Brandeis
version of New York fraudulent conveyance law was of universal
validity.
Financing arrangements of the type so summarily disposed of in
Benedict were not in wide use in 1925 when the case was decided.
After having read Justice Brandeis's stern and uncompromising
opinion, a student, ignorant of the history of this peculiar field,
might reasonably have assumed that Benedict had dealt such arrangements their death blow. The truth of the matter is that, within
ten years after Benedict and indeed as the direct result of Benedict,
there had been a sensational increase in the volume of receivables
financing arrangements under which the account debtors were not
notified of the assignment and the assignor made collections which
he then used in the ordinary course of his business.
The techniques which were promptly worked out for complying
with the rule in Benedict were, as we might expect, remarkably
complex. Justice Brandeis had suggested that the essential vice of
the financing arrangement in Benedict was that the assignor had
"unfettered dominion" over the assigned accounts. The answer, it
appeared, was for the assignee to assert "dominion" as a matter
of substance, to go on using the proceeds of the accounts which he
collected. Indeed the whole point of such arrangements was that
the proceeds should be available for use in the business until such
time as the assignors improving financial circumstances might make
it possible for him to reduce or retire his working capital loan.
Under Benedict-type receivables arrangements, the assignor was
required to remit all proceeds, as received, to the assignee. The
assignee then immediately "re-remitted" the proceeds to the assignor. Thus "dominion" had been triumphantly asserted without
interfering with the basic features of the financing arrangements.
Another customary provision in Benedict-inspiredloan agreements
required the maintenance of a fixed ratio between the outstanding
balance of the loan and the aggregate value of the assigned receivables. If their value fell below the agreed ratio, the assignor had to
pay down on the loan until the ratio was restored; to the extent
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that their value exceeded the ratio, he was entitled to draw down
further advances. In post-Benedict receivables financing, revolving
credit arrangements of this type became universal and the simple
term loan disappeared. As a matter of logic, it is hard to see why
the use of a revolving credit followed directly, or for that matter
indirectly, from anything Justice Brandeis had said in Benedict.
Nevertheless, on a formal level, the provision for a revolving credit
could be put forward as another instance of the assignee's unrelenting assertion of dominion over his security. On a practical level
the provision, with its requirement of frequent checks of the ratio
of assigned accounts to loan, insured that the assignee kept a close
watch on his debtors affairs and became, in the phrase which
presently came into use, his policeman.
As had been true in the field-warehousing sequence, the Supreme Court, after its first pronouncement, never had any more
to say about the issue. The lower courts, in the later case as in
the earlier one, agreed that a proper performance of the ritual
immunized the lenders from the fraudulent conveyance attack.
Improperly run field-warehouses, as we noted earlier, had quite
disappeared from the scene by 1940. Receivables arrangements
which did not comply with the rule in Benedict had disappeared
even earlier.
We have now traced, in three related areas of inventory and
receivables financing, the remarkably rapid growth of an extreme
type of dogmatic or ritualistic formalism. In each case the financing
arrangement in question, after having been apparently at the point
of death, went on in its new armor to an extraordinary success.
Before passing on, we will do well to inquire what results these
developments had on the general pattern of pre-Code financing
practices.
I suggest that there were two results of prime importance.
In the first place, the formalism resulted in a high degree of
professionalization or specialization in these areas of financing. Only
professionals could accomplish the tricky rituals of field-warehousing or comply with the rule in Benedict or cope with the almost
incomprehensible metaphysics of trust receipt financing. Widows,
orphans and country bankers would be well advised to stay away
from such mysteries. And in fact they did stay away. In time, the
carrying on of these involved operations became the quasi-monopoly
of a few large financing enterprises-they were the only ones who
had, through painful experience, acquired the necessary expertise.
In field-warehousing, for example, it is clear from the case reports
that in the early days there were a great many outfits which had
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gone into the business of setting up field-warehouses and issuing
receipts. By 1960 almost all the field-warehouses then in operation
were run by six large companies 7 and, since 1960, at least one of the
six has fallen by the wayside. The use of the trust receipt in
financing import transactions has always been restricted to a few of
the largest metropolitan banks-the same banks which have been
the exclusive issuers of international letters of credit: typically,
the import trust receipt proceeds from an antecedent letter of credit.
When the trust receipt was domesticated for use in automobile and
apppliance distribution, the handfull of national sales finance companies, which had pioneered the financing of automobile distribution, were, for a generation or more, almost the only practitioners
of the UTRA mystery. And the same sales finance companies, which
after 1930 diversified their business by going largely into commercial
receivables financing, were, during the 1930's and 1940's, the exalted
grand masters of the order of the Rule in Benedict.
Formalism in the law leads inevitably to this sort of professionalization. In turn, the resulting professionalization is what
makes the formalism work. So long as the amateurs can be kept
out and only the professionals play, the rules of the game, however
tricky they may be, will be punctiliously observed. It is indeed
striking how few transactions, in the areas we have been discussing,
were ever upset, once the professionals had taken over. The professionals are both victims and beneficiaries of the system: victims
in that they must go on meticulously observing their elaborate,
cumbersome and costly formalities; beneficiaries in that they are
the only ones who know how to do so, so that they enjoy a profitable
monopoly. The point of breakdown comes when the monopoly
appears to have become to profitable that the amateurs can no longer
be kept out. Rushing in with foolish tread, the amateurs can destroy
overnight the delicate balance which has been established with such
difficulty and maintained with such skill.
The second important result of formalism in security law was
closely related to the first. The formalism, as I have suggested,
became most extreme in the areas of inventory and receivables
financing. A business enterprise which needs more working capital
may seek to raise it through private loans from banks or other
financing institutions or through a public issue of securities. In
either case, it can put up some or all of its assets as security for
the loan or for the debentures or bonds. The assets available for use
as security are typically the plant and equipment, inventory and
present and future receivables. To judge by the case reports, up to
7

Comment, Financing Inventory Through Field Warehousing, 69 YALE
L. J. 663, 681-82 (1960).
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1920 or so it was common for all these assets to be pledged or hypothecated en bloc. After 1920-and particularly after the crash of
1929-the pattern changed significantly. The inventory and receivables no longer formed part of the security package for the long term
capital financing, which now was arranged on the security of the
plant and equipment alone. Why this change should have taken
place is easy to understand. The institutions or individuals who
provided the long-term capital were simply not in a position to cope
with the formalities required to make security arrangements in
inventory and receivables proof against attack. Furthermore, the
most paralysing aspect of the Benedict rule, as the courts worked
it out, was that a transaction which offended the rule in the
slightest degree, with respect to an infinitesimal amount of the
security, was subject to avoidance in toto.8 Thus, hypothetically, a
$50,000,000 loan, secured by plant and equipment worth $100,000,000
as well as by a few dollars worth of receivables thrown into the
package for good measure, would lose all the security if it turned
out that the receivables had not been handled in strict compliance
with the rule in Benedict. Under these circumstances the professional draftsmen of corporate indentures and loan agreements soon
learned to restrict themselves to the plant and equipment as
security, leaving the inventory and receivables as a base for separate
financing by the newly emerging groups of professionals in those
fields. Thus there came to be a division of labor among the two
professional groups who specialized in working out the details of
these financing arrangements. Long term financing on the security
of the fixed assets of a business enterprise was divorced from
financing on the security of the enterprise's most liquid and volatile
assets-its inventory and receivables.
This line of division made a good deal of sense, no matter how
obscure or absurd the reasons for it may have been in the first
place. Inventory and receivables are, by their nature, in a constant
state of flux; they may be subject to abrupt seasonal variations and
market fluctuations; as a doomed enterprise approaches its final
agony, the inventory and receivables are, with disturbing frequency,
apt to disappear, as the result of overt fraud or through the gradual
attrition of decreasing sales. Inventory and receivables financing is
high-risk financing. Lenders who rely on such quicksilver security
will, if they are wise, devise techniques for control or policing of the
debtor's affairs which would be unnecessary and even grotesque in
the altogether more stable world of fixed asset financing. The enforced separation of the two types of financing may have been, in
8 Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930) became the

leading case on this aspect of the Benedict rule.
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the first instance, a purely legal response to the conceptual complexities of trust receipt theory or to the involutions of the rule in
Benedict. But, in the world of practical affairs, there was, as the
professionals gradually came to see, much to be said for the separation, quite without regard to the legal formalisms.
In the late 1940's the Article 9 draftsmen (I was one of them)
set to work, bearing a banner with the strange device: Simplify.
They argued from an unquestionably correct premise: the end result
of a hundred years of security law was that, almost everywhere, it
had become possible for a secured lender to cover all of his debtor's
present and future personal property with valid and enforceable
security arrangements. From that premise, the draftsmen argued to
a possibly questionable conclusion: what could in fact be done
should be capable of being done simply. The extraordinary confusion which personal property security law had achieved, its subtle
doctrines and involved rituals, were, they explained, merely hangovers from the Hundred Years War. Those memorials of ancient
battlegrounds should be torn down and scrapped. Security law
should cease to be a paradise for specialists and should become a
playground for all the people-small town practitioners, country
bankers, even widows and orphans. Taking a personal property
security interest should be made as simple and easy as rolling off
a log. But what is it, exactly, that happens after you have rolled
off a log?
I suggested earlier that the principal beneficiaries of the complexities of pre-Code security law had been the professionals-the
large metropolitan banks, the finance companies and so on who,
with the advice of counsel, were the only ones who knew how
to operate the machine. One would assume, therefore, that the
simplifying approach of the Code draftsmen would have met with
massed opposition in these quarters. My own best memory is that
there was, indeed, during the early years of work on the drafting
of Article 9, a certain ambivalence toward the project on the part
of counsel to the large banks and finance companies. Eventually,
however, most of these gentlemen became, and persuaded their
clients to become, supporters of Article 9 and of the Code. Perhaps
this teaches us that man does not live by bread, or even by logic,
alone. Or that all lawyers, even the most devoted representatives
of the most predatory of vested interests, are, beneath their wolf's
clothing, sheepishly pro bono publico at heart. But why should they
have identified the public interest with a simplification of a state of
law whose preservation, it would seem, was required by their private interest.

SECURITY LAW, FORMALISM AND ARTICLE 9
We have been told on good authority that ideas have their time:
when the time has come, the idea proves irresistible. In this connection, it is worth recalling that Article 9 was by no means the
first attempt to codify, and thus simplify, security law. The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had prepared
several security statutes. Of these the Trust Receipts Act, which
can hardly be described as an essay in simplification, was, in terms
of the number of enacting states, the only successful one and its
success was the result of a number of special and peculiar circumstances. The Conditional Sales Act (1918) was enacted in a handfull
of states and then faded from sight. The Chattel Mortgage Act
(1927) was never enacted anywhere: its failure is of particular
interest since, in its structure and in the underlying policy which
it adopted, the Chattel Mortgage Act was a blood-brother of Article
9. We can say that the time for simplification of security law through
a general codification, which had not arrived in 1930, had, quite
obviously, arrived in 1960. Can we say anything more?
I have made the point that the extreme formalism of security
law went hand in hand with its professionalization and that, once
the professionals had taken over, noncomplying or amateurish transactions disappeared, for all practical purposes, from the case reports.
This state of affairs seems to have obtained through the 1940's. A
striking feature of the case law since 1950 is the reappearance in
litigation of amateurish transactions of a type which had not been
seen since the 1920's and early 1930'. 9 Evidently after World War II,
the amateurs had decided to play. In this context the amateurs were
the small or country banks-and, for that matter the small or country finance companies-which had not previously engaged in inventory or receivables financing. It is a reasonable hypothesis that such
lenders were alerted to the profitable possibilities of such financing
during World War II when the demand for private capital to finance
war production was insatiable and when, in fact if not in theory, the
federal government stood ready to absorb all losses. Such a banker's
paradise, of course, could not, and did not, long endure. But the
wartime revelation of the possibilities of inventory and receivables
as security seems to have stimulated a good deal of post-war
financing of this type in siutations where neither the lenders nor the
borrowers (who were mostly small, and presumably undercapitalized, businesses) nor the lawyers who advised them had more than
the vaguest understanding of either the legal formalities or the
9 For such cases, see the discussion of recent litigation in 1 G. GILMonE,
SECURITY INTERESTS 3x PERsONAL PROPERTY ch. 4 (The Trust Receipt),

ch. 5 (The Factor's Lien), ch. 6 (Field Warehousing) and ch. 8 (Accounts Receivable Financing). There was a particularly interesting
series of New Hampshire cases, decided in both state and federal courts.
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practical realities. Even without a major depression, there was
after 1950 a surprising amount of litigation involving security transactions which, from the professional point of view, had been conceived in ignorance and brought forth with fumbling incompetence.
With a major depression, God only knows what would have
happened.
The successful maintenance of a formalized system of law depends, as was suggested earlier, on professionalization. When the
amateurs come in, the system will break down; the tight, rigid rules
of the formal period will be in time replaced by broader and looser
categories. Maintenance of the system requires that those who
break the rules be penalized-in the context of our discussion, that
the lenders be stripped of their security. The courts will do this so
long as there is only an occasional noncomplying transaction. But
when the amateur transactions multiply, the courts will temper the
wind to the shorn lamb-the lender will not be stripped naked even
though it is clear as a crystal that he has failed to understand the
intricacies of §2 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act or of the rule of
Benedict v. Ratner. In the process of dismantling a formal system,
there will be a considerable sacrifice of certainty and predictability:
the great virtue of such a system is that, for those who understand
it, you know where you are and what happens next.
I suggest that a fair reading of the pre-Code case law of the
1950's and early 1960's is that the dismantling process which I have
just hypothesized was in fact going on-or at least beginning. The
evidence stops well this side of scientific, or even legal, proof. There
were not enough cases to allow anyone-even a law professor-to
talk confidently and dogmatically of a change or a new direction or
even a trend. It is, I think, true that in a surprising number of cases
the amateur lenders were not penalized for their transgressions by
being stripped of their security as their predecessors would have
been, routinely, thirty years earlier. These cases can, of course, be
put down to judicial ignorance-perhaps there are country judges as
well as country bankers-but judicial ignorance is, after all, one of
the prime causes of growth in the law.
From the hypothesis just suggested I would argue that the
lesson of the case law of the past twenty years is that, quite without
regard to Article 9, security law was beginning to simplify, or purify,
itself. The formal system was in process of breakdown on the
almost instinctive level of case law. If the case law process had
been allowed to continue through the 1960's and 1970's, the breakdown might, in the light of our hypothesis, have been complete.
That process was abruptly terminated by the general enactment of
Article 9 and the Code. But the forces which were finding one
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expression in the surprising case-law harvest of the 1950's may well
have found another expression in Article 9 itself. The time having
come for the dismantling of the earlier formal system, there was
much to be said for carrying out the demolition job as cleanly as
possible by way of a general codification instead of attacking it by
way of the hit-or-miss disorder of a case-law revolution. What the
spirit of the times required was that the job be done, one way or
the other. By good fortune Article 9 happened to become available
just at the time it was needed.
None of the post World War II developments which had been
rehearsed had anything to do with Article 9. Nor, if I may be permitted to bear testimony, were they in any sense foreseen by the
draftsmen or their professional advisers. Perhaps the draftsmen
were obscurely in touch with the shape of things to come-since
the future is, by necessary hypothesis, unpredictable, it is entirely
possible, if you are lucky, to be right, albeit for the wrong reasons.
Perhaps the professionals, who supported a statutory simplification
of security law which ran counter to their own apparent interests,
were wiser than they knew. And perhaps we have a tenuous beginning of an explanation of the curious fact that the time for simplification of security law through a general codification, which had
not come in 1930, had come in 1960.
In carrying out their self-proclaimed mission of simplification,
the Article 9 draftsmen worked, of necessity, out of the past. Draftsmen do not have a crystal ball for peering into the future. What
they can do, in a legal context, is to read the old cases and the
existing statutes and reduce the past to a sort of order. Article 9
can best be described as an anthological collection of the most celebrated security law controversies of the preceding forty years.
Inventory financing and the security devices which it generated,
receivables financing and the rule in Benedict-these are anthologized at length. But lesser controversies are not neglected-such as
those which had arisen in connection with the validity of afteracquired property interests and of arrangements for future advances. 0 For an understanding of Article 9 it is essential to realize
that almost all of its specific content-the detail and verbiage of its
fifty sections-was a faithful copying-out of historical models. Almost nothing new was added.
10 With exception for crops and consumer goods, UNiFORmV COMmcAL
CODE §9-203(3) provides that: "[A] security agreement may provide
that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered
by the security agreement." U=urORM COMMERcIAL CODE §9-204(5)
provides that "Obligations covered by a security agreement may
include future advances or other value whether or not the advances
or value are given pursuant to commitment."
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It was suggested earlier that the Article 9 draftsmen argued
from the premise that, under existing security law, a lender could
take an enforceable interest in all of a debtor's present and future
personal property to the conclusion that the new statute should
provide for the accomplishment of this result in the simplest possible
fashion. Their quest for simplicity led them to a solution which
seemed to have a certain novelty, at least of form and language: all
the security "devices"-pledge, mortgage, conditional sale, trust rereceipt, factor's lien and so on through the lengthy list-were to be
abolished; in their place was substituted the concept of a unitary
"security interest"." Thus, at a single stroke, all the involved
metaphysical speculations about the "true nature" of a conditional
sale or a trust receipt transaction or what not were rendered meaningless. There was no need in Article 9 for any analogue to the
horrid complexities of UTRA §2. The concept of the unitary security
interest also led naturally to the substitution of a single and considerably simplified filing system for the half-dozen different systems, kept in different books at different places by different officials
operating under different theories, which successive pre-Code security statutes had established. There can be no doubt that these
were the two major contributions which Article 9 made to the
simplification of security law.
The draftsmen also set out to eradicate what they considered to
be the meaningless formalism which had grown up in such areas as
receivables financing and field-warehousing. In the first instance
they were successful; in the second they ran into an effective roadblock set by the field-warehousemen themselves and were defeated.
Code §9-205 is a thorough-going and explicit repealer of the rule
in Benedict, at least of the formal aspects of the rule. Gone is any
vestige of the requirement that the assignee somehow assert dominion over the assigned accounts; a Code security interest is a
security interest still although the assignor's dominion is absolute,
without remittances or even any accounting for the proceeds of
collections. An attempt was, however, made to preserve what were
considered to be the substantive, as distinguished from the formalistic, aspects of the rule. Thus, under §9-306 (4) the Code assignee
who does police his debtors affairs according to the time-honored
Benedict technique is given, in the event of the debtor's insolvency,
a right to proceeds which the non-policing assignee does not have.
It is worth noting that the professionals in receivables financing who
advised the draftsmen enthusiastically supported this resolution of
the Benedict problem.
11 UIFomv COMMCIaCL CODE

§9-102.
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The draftsmen also proposed to scrap the rituals of field ware-

housing. This was to have been done by treating field warehousing
like any other method of inventory financing and imposing a filing
requirement for perfection of the interest. Since the filing would
constitute perfection, the details of the operation of the warehouse
would no longer have any legal, although they would obviously
continue to have great practical, significance. No representatives of
the field warehousing industry, as it happened, had taken any part
in the drafting of Article 9. When they learned of the proposed disestablishment of their mystery, they protested vigorously, indeed
violently and, as it proved, effectively. It may be that the almost
mystical devotion of the field-warehousing professionals to the
ritual of their role as common law pledgees is to be explained by
the accident of their non-participation in the drafting. Having
escaped the indoctrination or brainwashing which had led the other
professionals to their surprising support of the Article 9 proposals,
the field warehousemen naturally reacted in defense of their own
position and their own immediate interests. After a protracted controversy the proposed filing requirement was deleted; in its place
there was added to the final draft of Article 9 a stern admonition
which provided in substance that nothing in the Article should be
taken to "relax" common law requirements for the validity of field-

warehousing arrangements.12
The failure to free field-warehousing from its self-imposed
rituals leaves us in a situation which should be of interest to future
historians. Here is one enclave in which, so far as the statutory
formulation of Article 9 goes, the pre-Code formalism is to be maintained in all its ancient rigor. We have hypothesized that there
would have been in any event and without regard to Article 9 a
gradual breakdown of the pre-Code formalism. The status of the
field warehousing enclave is of course not exactly what it would
have been without Article 9 since the courts in Code states are
admonished to preserve the formalism and to penalize any amateur
who rashly undertakes to operate a field-warehouse without having
the awesome expertise of the Lawrence Warehouse Company. In
twenty years or so we shall be able to see how the courts have
carried out the curious legislative mandate that they should preserve one strip of formal garden within the area where nature is
otherwise allowed to have its way. In this connection it is worth
sentence). The first senis the repealer of the rule
in Benedict previously mentioned. The two sentences of UuFosM
CODE §9-205, read together, can be taken to mean that the
ComvmERcr
rule of Benedict is still in force for field-warehousing transactions
although abolished for all other transactions.

1 UNIFORM COI V=CIAL CODE §9-205 (second
tence of Ukuromvt ConvrxmcIAL CODE §9-205
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noting that there has been a great deal of field-warehousing litigation since 1950 which has raised novel issues whose existence had
not even been suspected in the earlier period when the only litigable
issue had seemed to be whether or not the rituals had been observed.13 It may be of course that the field-warehousemen, abandoning their traditional mysticism, will decide to accept in the 1970's
the simplification which they rejected in the 1950's-but that speculation need not be further pursued.
Even when they were not overborne by political pressures, the
Article 9 draftsmen were not always successful in achieving the
simplification which they were in quest of. Occasionally they stumbled over their own feet. This was notably true in their classification of property which not only divided goods into four classes 14 but
went on to divide intangibles into six more classes, 15 it is hard not to
see, retrospectively, that the elaborateness of the classification was
unnecessary. At other times the draftsmen seem to have been
carried away by their own enthusiasm: the priority provisions of
the Article purport to solve not only all the priority problems that
had even been heard of in the real world but also a good many more
that had never existed except in the imagination of the draftsmen.
This part of the Article does not lack for subtle complexity. 16
Even on its own terms, then, Article 9 does not reduce security
law to the kindergarten level. Lawyers who enjoy the puzzle-solving aspect of law will find plenty to sharpen their wits on in the
statutory text. Furthermore it is true that in the fifteen years or
so since the Article, except for a few details, reached its final form,
events have overtaken it. I made the point earlier that the specific
content of the Article stands rooted-necessarily-in the past. We
can now begin to see the shape of current controversies which the
Article 9 draftsmen did not foresee. Thus there has been, during
the past few years, a great deal of anxious discussion about subordination agreements and negative covenants.' 7 A great many
13 The recent field warehousing litigation is discussed in I G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§6.5-6.8.2 (1965).
CODE §9-109 ("consumer goods", "equipment",

14 UNIFORMW COMMERCIAL

"farm products", "inventory,").
COMMERCIAL CODE §9-105 ("chattel paper", "document",
"instrument",); UNiFORMv COMMERCIAL CODE §9-106 ("account", "contract right", "general intangibles",).
16 In general, Part III UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§9-301-9-318) is
15 UNIFORM

17

devoted to the resolution of priority problems. The heart of the matter
is UNIFORI COMMERCIAL CODE §9-312.
See particularly Coogan, Kripke, and Weiss, The Outer Fringes of

Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money
and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and ParticipationAgreements,
79 HARV. L. REV. 229 (1965).
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questions have been asked but the only thing that is clear is that
the answers are not in Article 9. There will in time be other examples of unforeseen and indeed unforeseeable problems.
The fact that Article 9 has, in its short life span, already been
caught short or found wanting does not differentiate it from the
rest of the Code or from earlier codifying statutes. Indeed the possibility of a successful codification depends in great part on what
might be called the principle of statutory obsolescence.' 8 The great
bulk of any codifying statute will be obsolete by the time the statute
is enacted. This apparently unhappy fact of life is indeed what
makes it possible for us to live with such statutes, despite inevitably
changing circumstances, without being intolerably burdened by their
freight of antiquarian detail. Fifty years ago the questions unanswered by Article 9 would have been left for solution to the
leisurely tempo of case law approximation. It is too early to tell
whether that will continue to be the case or whether, in this half of
the century, the basic codifying statute will be kept up to date-or
as close to date as the principle of obsolescence permits-by a continuous process of amendment.
Despite its own complexities and despite the additional complexities introduced by unforeseen change, Article 9 must be
credited with having in fact achieved a dramatic simplification of
security law. It can be said, without too much exaggeration, that
an Article 9 secured party can take a blanket security interest in all
his debtors present and future assets almost as easily as he could
roll off a log. Which brings us back to the question which was earlier
left unanswered: what is it, exactly, that happens after you have
rolled off a log?
The answer, I am inclined to think, is that you get your fingers
burnt. The more you give in to the temptation of taking the greatest possible advantage of the Article's permissive provisions, the
greater the danger that you will end up getting burnt. The simpler
you can make your transactions, the safer you will be. Unless there
is some compelling reason why you must include an after-acquired
property clause in your security agreement or provide for future
advances or take inventory or receivables as collateral, the best advice is: Don't. For this depressing bit of advice, there are several
excellent reasons.
One is that Article 9 simplifies only the legal concepts and
formalities. The dangers inherent in high risk financing are exactly
18 1 have developed this idea at greater length in Gilmore, On Statutory
Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 461 (1967).
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what they always have been. If you must fool with such doubtful
security as inventory and receivables, you will do well to learn and
practice the techniques of control and policing which the professionals have always practiced. There are no indications that the
professionals themselves have in any way relaxed their pre-Code
techniques.
A second reason is that after-acquired property clauses, future
advance arrangements and security agreements which cover inventory or receivables will bring you to grips with the Article 9 priority
provisions. These, as has been pointed out, do not lack for complexity. You can avoid most priority problems by avoiding the
refinements I have just mentioned. If you do not, you had best set
aside a good part of your time over the next year or two for turning
yourself into an Article 9 specialist.
A third reason is that the same refinements may get you into
trouble on the vaguely mapped frontier where inconsistent bodies
of state and federal law come into conflict. Such security arrangements, entirely valid, let us assume, and properly perfected under
Article 9, may nevertheless be subject to avoidance as preferences
under §60 of the Bankruptcy Act or subject to subordination, outside
of bankruptcy, to federal tax liens as well as to non-lien federal
claims under §3466 of the Revised Statutes, the so-called priority
statute.
With respect to the problems created by the intersection of
Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act, there has been so far almost no
litigation' 9 but there has already come into being a monumental
literature on the subject. The principal difficulty is that §60, most
recently revised in 1950, speaks the language of pre-Code security
law and not the language of Article 9. Arguably, the differences are
merely semantic; arguably-at least there are respectable lawyers
who have so argued-they are more than semantic and more than
one provision of Article 9 is invalid as being in conflict with the
overriding policy of the federal Bankruptcy Act. For example, one
Article 9 provision which has frequently come under attack is §9-108,
which purports to give new value status to certain interests in afteracquired property; according to its critics, §9-108 vainly attempts to
convert transfers for antecedent debt into transfers for a present
exchange and is therefore invalid in a proceeding governed by
federal law, which makes its own determination about such matters.
The National Bankruptcy Conference is currently studying proposals for reconciling Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. If that
19 One widely discussed case is In re Portland Newspaper Publishing
Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967).
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project is successful, a great deal of unnecessary doubt and confusion
will be put to rest. But the doubt and confusion will, at best, be
with us for at least the next few years.
With respect to the priority of federal claims for debts and
taxes, we have a brand-new statute-the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966 (which does not, it should be noted, say anything about the
federal priority under §3466). One of the main purposes of the
draftsmen of the Tax Lien Act was to give protection to certain
types of secured financing against the doctrine of virtually absolute
federal priority which, since 1950, the Supreme Court had been
elaborating both under the earlier tax lien statute and under §3466.
The Tax Lien Act rivals even the Uniform Trust Receipts Act20 for
It
the obscurity of its language and the subtlety of its concepts.
21
also appears that one provision of the Act, which was designed to
give lenders who are committed to make future advances a degree
of protection against the federal lien, may not have achieved its
intended result: the federal draftsmen, it seems, were not entirely
conversant with some of the more obscure Article 9 priority provisions and, as a result, may have made the Act say the opposite
of what it was meant to say.
These brief references to federal law suggest, by way of conconclusion, the gloomy though that confusion and a state of extraordinary complexity in security law may be inherent in the nature
of things and that the simplification of the law which Article 9
achieved on the state level was merely an illusory triumph and a
passing episode. Perhaps the long guerrilla war is not really over
and all that has happened is that the battle-lines are reforming, as
they have so many times in the past, to fight over new ground. It is
at all events a fair guess that security law will continue to be, over
the next fifty years, as quirky and unpredictable in its development,
as fascinating to the legal historian and as frustrating to the practicioner, as it ever has been in the past.

20

21

For an admirable discussion of the Tax Lien Act, see Plumb, Federal
Liens and Priorities-Agendafor the Next Decade, 77 YALu L.J. 228
(1967) (the first installment of a three part article).
INTERNAL RwvNEm CODE of 1954, § 6323 (c) (1) (B).

